



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ENHANCING MILITARY COOPERATION  
AMONG "ASEAN" COUNTRIES

BY

COLONEL CHOLID CHOZALI

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ENHANCING MILITARY COOPERATION  
AMONG "ASEAN" COUNTRIES

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
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Colonel Cholid Ghozali, Indonesia

Colonel Neil S. Hock  
Project Adviser

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## ABSTRACT

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This study explores the prospect and possibility for extension of military cooperation among the ASEAN members. It is an attempt to convince political and military leaders in ASEAN countries that such proper application of military cooperation should be fostered to enhance the military capabilities among the ASEAN members. The study discusses the probable external challenges faced by ASEAN and kinds of military cooperation appropriate to ASEAN leading to the enhancement of military capability.

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ENHANCING MILITARY COOPERATION  
AMONG "ASEAN" COUNTRIES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

General

Four attempts were made to form regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. The first was SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) an organization which was set up as a collection security arrangement with military undertaking for preserving peace. The second was ASA (Association of Southeast Asia), the third was Maphilindo (Malaya, Philippines and Indonesia) and the fourth was the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Indonesia was not part of either SEATO or ASA, since both of them were perceived as the offspring of the Cold War, therefore the participation of Indonesia would constitute a betrayal to its independent and active foreign policy. Maphilindo in which Indonesia was a member, did not succeed long because of serious political disputes among its three members that ruined this fragile organization.

ASEAN's declared objectives, set out in its founding charter signed on August 8, 1967, are to foster regional cooperation by nonmilitary means, chiefly through economic, technical, scientific and cultural interchange. Despite its avowed character, it was obvious that political and security considerations were significant in the motivation of ASEAN's founding. The Bangkok Declaration, furthermore, speaks of the determination of the member countries

to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form of manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples.<sup>1</sup>

In its progress, ASEAN has not only survived but has actually developed in terms of international status and the commitments of its member states. ASEAN has provided the states of non-Communist Southeast Asia with a basis for regional stability, that in many respects could be regarded as the enlightened product of intraregional conflict given the shared understanding at the time of its creation.

By all means, ASEAN cooperation has made significant progress in the last 20 years, the achievement of which was free from involvement or role of any outside power.

With the Bangkok Declaration and its subsequent documents, ASEAN has formulated a set of codes of conduct on its relations among themselves and between ASEAN and outside powers.

The following documents are evidence in the efforts to strengthen and accelerate cooperation:

- o Kuala Lumpur Declaration (1971): proclaiming Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). It recognized the important role of political stability which could play in sustaining development of the ASEAN countries. The ZOPFAN concept is a long-term strategy to free the region from any form of interference by outside powers.

- o Bali Declaration of ASEAN Concord (1976): laid down the principles and directives to be followed in ASEAN's bid for a viable and cohesive regional organization through cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, political and information field, and the improvement of the ASEAN machinery.

- o The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (1976): The object was not only to accelerate the economic growth in the region in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of nations in Southeast

Asia; it also contained a code of conduct for interstate relations, including the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Nevertheless there are significant differences of opinion in the region about threats to security. For three of the nations--Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines--internal threats are considered a more immediate and important than external threats. The persistence and, for some countries, the dramatic escalation of internal insurgencies and instabilities have been major driving factors in their military buildups. Perhaps only Thailand perceives an external threat to be preeminent and immediate.

Assessments of potential long-term external threats also differ. Indonesia sees China as the more likely threat in the future, not the Soviet Union or Vietnam. Still, while most of the nations are primarily concerned with counterinsurgency, an important part of the non-Communist buildup has been expanded to acquire capabilities to meet external threats.

Indonesia, with the largest population and military forces in ASEAN has undertaken a foreign policy which is guided by a new realism in approach and vision, closely attuned to the real needs and interests of its citizens. This is reflected in the government's relations with states in the region, and giving priority consideration to regional stability and cooperation.

It was these considerations that found structural realization in ASEAN, an association for regional cooperation comprised of more than 250 million people of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei and Thailand. The historic significance of ASEAN is that it reflects the trend towards regional cohesion rather than chronic divisiveness, cooperation instead of confrontation. It reflects the growing determination of the nations of this region to take charge of their own future, to work out problems of their development, stability and security together. It signifies

the rejection by the members of the assumption that the fate of Southeast Asia is going to continue to be determined by outside powers.

ASEAN can be said to have succeeded in molding an increasing degree of political cohesion among its member and a more integrated approach towards common problems. Moreover, ASEAN has a strong solidarity resulting from long lasting cooperation which can be exploited by member nations themselves to enhance the stability of the region. In the meantime, however, a consideration of a military cooperation policy on the bilateral basis among the ASEAN countries, can be fostered based practically on its common needs for the stability of the region. As a further justification, an acceptable military cooperation is not beyond the principle "inter-state relations, including the peaceful settlement of disputes."

#### Purpose

To explore the prospect and possibility for the extension of military cooperation among the ASEAN members.

#### Objective

To convince political and military leaders in ASEAN countries that such proper application of military cooperation should be fostered to enhance the military capabilities among the ASEAN members.

#### Scope and Methodology

Discussing the probable external challenges faced by ASEAN and kinds of military cooperation appropriate to ASEAN leading to the enhancement of military capability, with the following methodology:

- o Introduction;
- o Challenges to ASEAN;
- o ASEAN response;

- o Military cooperation in application;
- o Conclusion.

#### ENDNOTES

1. Nana S. Sutresna, "ASEAN Co-operation: Problems and Prospects," The Indonesian Quarterly, XV/1, 1987, p. 99.

## CHAPTER II

### CHALLENGES TO ASEAN

#### General

On the strategic dimension, the ASEAN states are situated astride the most important route connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Indonesian archipelago stretching more than 3,000 miles and Malaysia sit astride a series of relatively narrow straits which could be used to monitor and interdict ships moving between the two oceans. Only a few of the channels through the Indonesian archipelago are wide and deep enough to permit the safe passage of submerged submarines. These straits, including Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Ombai-Wetar are vital and vulnerable chokepoints for the sea lanes into both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This strategic location obviously attracts the external rivalry, especially the major powers.

The external challenges, of course, are very significant, however their nature and their overall importance must be seen from many different perspectives.

The fact is that no ASEAN country (excluding Thailand in some instances) is seriously concerned about its external challenges. No country expects to be invaded, and no country anticipated the arrival of an enemy fleet in its territorial waters.

Externally, ASEAN leaders may be concerned about foreign economic penetration, the unplanned importation of alien cultural values and practices that are thought to be destructive of indigenous value systems, or the political and economic implications of technology transfer. All of this, constitute external challenges to the nation's physical security. In other words, those kinds of challenges, eventually could affect the internal stability of any countries in the region, and eventually the regional

stability of ASEAN as a whole. Coupled with uncertainties arising during a period of rapid technological, economic and social change within the setting of a volatile, troubled and unpredictable world, ASEAN leaders feel that the external challenges can make their internal stability more difficult. Moreover, most of the leaders believe that one or more of the major powers will exploit the internal problems to the benefit of the external forces.

The great diversity that marks the ASEAN States, in terms of national priorities, aspirations, traditions and the dynamics of internal politics are the primary reasons to view the external challenges in different perceptions. Therefore ASEAN leaders believe a military pact is an unacceptable solution to the external challenges, however, in terms of military cooperation a bilateral arrangement pattern is one of the options. In addition, the concept of such military cooperation must not be perceived as a new model of a western neocolonial proposal.

The developments in Southeast Asia are to some extent influenced by developments in the relationship between the two superpowers, the United States and USSR. In practice, however, especially since the invasion of Kampuchea by Vietnam in December 1978, much of ASEAN's time and resources has been taken up with trying to get the Vietnamese out of Kampuchea as part of a negotiated political settlement. Meanwhile, China, a major power in the Asia-Pacific region, will always be seen as posing a challenge negatively and positively to the countries in Southeast Asia. Another power in this region, Japan, has become an important economic partner of ASEAN countries. A primary factor in Japan's relations with ASEAN is its ability to adjust to the challenges of internationalization in a fundamental way. Moreover, ASEAN is also concerned with the stability of its neighboring countries either the Southwest Pacific in the east, or the South Asia and Burma in the west.

### Superpower Interests

A main strategic goal of the superpowers (U.S. and USSR) is to avoid direct military confrontation with each other. However, secondary interests, such as--the protection of sea lanes (U.S.) or the establishment of military positions (USSR)--require ties with regional members who may already be arrayed as antagonists. By assisting regional allies in attaining their security requirement, then, the superpowers enter into relationships that may move them toward confrontation. This kind of situation is not expected by the ASEAN members, since the instability of the region will be the price of such relationship involvement.

Competition between the two superpowers appears to have become more controlled as manifested in the negotiations on strategic arms, combined effort to fight terrorist activities and even in the promotion of bilateral economic relations.

In the meantime, despite the improvements of Soviet relations with the West, the USSR is likely to continue to increase its military presence in a number of regions, including the Southeast Asia. Being an Asian country as well, the Soviet Union will maintain or increase its military power in the Southeast Asia region to increase its influence. In viewing this increase, the United States would continue with the buildup of U.S. military capabilities in this region vis-a-vis USSR.

### Indochina Problems

The primary confrontation in Southeast Asia for the past eight ears is centered in Indochina. The Kampuchean conflict has not only increased the insecurity of the surrounding countries, but it also has further implications towards ASEAN, which include:

- o The threat posed by Soviet Union's use of naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay.
- o The threat to Thailand posed by Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea.
- o The danger of possible Vietnamese and/or Soviet support for communist insurgencies in ASEAN states.
- o The instability created by large numbers of refugees, particularly in Thailand's eastern provinces.

To some extent, the United States military presence has prevented the polarization of Southeast Asia into pro-Soviet and pro-China blocs.

Furthermore, the United States is expanding the Seventh Fleet, encouraging a greater Japanese defense effort and increasing arms sales to ASEAN.

From ASEAN's perspective, the reliance on a combination of Chinese military pressure on Vietnam's northern borders and U.S. arms aid to Bangkok has led the United States to adopt China's intransigent posture towards any negotiation settlement of the Kampuchean issue that does not include complete Vietnamese military withdrawal. The prospect of greater U.S. aid to the non-communist segments of the Kampuchean resistance, on the other hand, is welcomed by ASEAN since it increases the viability of a non Khmer Rouge alternative to Vietnam's occupation. Meanwhile, there is evidence that Vietnamese accept the idea of negotiation with the non-communist element of the Kampuchean resistance if the Khmer Rouge were removed from the coalition.

There is even a more immediate problem ahead arising out of the many aspects of threat the Kampuchean conflict could pose. Should the present stalemate continue, and should the Hanoi-Moscow relationship become stronger, then the Soviet presence in Southeast Asia will grow stronger and pose a more formidable challenge to the stability in the ASEAN region. The political advantages the Soviet Union gained through its military cooperation with

Vietnam, is certainly substantial, considering the access to Vietnamese ports has, will eventually increase the capabilities to Soviet's fleet. In turn, it has improved Soviet intelligence gathering capabilities throughout Southeast Asia.

In relation to ASEAN problems, however, all parties involved or interested in the Kampuchean conflict, is faced with a painful dilemma:

should ASEAN accept the situation and seek a settlement that would leave Hanoi to a larger measure on effective sphere of influence over Kampuchea, but hold out some prospects for stabilized relations between ASEAN and the three Indochina States.<sup>1</sup>

#### Other Challenges

There are many reasons for the ambivalence on the part of Southeast Asian nations towards China. Historically, the Southeast Asian region has always been considered by China as a region under its sphere influence. The South China Sea, for example, is still seen by China as a Chinese Sea. Of irritation to Southeast Asian countries is the Chinese ambiguous policy on the citizenship status of ethnic Chinese residing in another country, namely that they can regain their Chinese citizenship if they return to the PRC.

In addition, these people can enter China without a visa. The Chinese call for overseas Chinese to invest in China has also caused great concern misfeelings in Southeast Asia. At the same time, China is equally seen as a future competitor to Southeast Asian countries, politically and especially economically as well as posing a military threat if its modernization program is successful.

Conversely, the modernization and the development of China could have positive implications for the region, including Southeast Asia. A successful modernization of its society may lead China to enter the world community as a responsible member that observes "the rules of the game." This should, among

other things, be manifested in termination of its support to Communist parties or movement in ASEAN countries. Moreover, China's economic progress could also provide new economic opportunities for the region. As such, China can become a stabilizing factor for the Southeast Asia region. Whatever be the challenge posed by China, a China with full responsibility in the international community is definitely more conducive to regional peace and stability than a radical and militaristic China.

Japan's economic role in the ASEAN region is likely to continue to be dominant. On the other hand, Japan's economy will also be affected by the development in the ASEAN region. This interdependence has led to greater economic cooperation between Japan and the countries of ASEAN, which in some respects has been undertaken within the framework of Japan's comprehensive security policy.

In spite of the great progress achieved in strengthening its relations with ASEAN countries over the past 10 to 15 years, there is still the need for Japan to expand its relations to the field of science and technology as well as culture and to be more open its dealings, especially with its neighbors. Japan is the most important ally of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region, and the area can expect an increased military role by Japan under the United States-Japan alliance relationship. For now, Japan's efforts are confined to the defense of its homeland and the contiguous waters. However, changes in leadership in the future could result in stronger political pressure for Japan to do more in this field. Further deterioration of bilateral U.S.-Japan trade relations could also increase such pressures. This possibility suggests the importance of intensive dialogues and consultation between Japan and countries in the region regarding its defense policy.

Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and other South Pacific island countries, constituting the Southwest Pacific region, have increasingly become an important factor in the affairs of the Asia-Pacific Zone. ASEAN, which is an immediate neighbor to the southwest Pacific region, is interested in the stability of this region.

ASEAN's growing interest in this region, has been shown by its efforts to strengthen cooperation with the South Pacific Forum, and by inviting PNG as a special observer in all ASEAN meetings. Indonesia, for example, has focused its economic and technical cooperation with countries outside ASEAN primarily to those in South Pacific; PNG in particular. Nevertheless, recent developments in the Southwest Pacific suggest that the importance of this region to other countries in Asia and the Pacific should go beyond that of ASEAN's interest as an immediate neighbor.

The concern surrounding the deteriorating situation in South Asia, Sri Lanka in particular and the need for restoration of the inherent rights of the Afghan people is not beyond ASEAN's sphere of concern. Concurrently, Burma, the silent country in Southeast Asia region, is still confronted with multiple insurgency situations and economic problems. Should these situations be exacerbated by the external interference, the stability of ASEAN will be affected adversely. Therefore, ASEAN needs to be more aggressive in integration of policy to meet these complex challenges.

#### ENDNOTES

1. Nana S. Sutresna, "ASEAN Co-operation: Problems and Prospects," The Indonesian Quarterly, XV/1, 1987, p. 102.

## CHAPTER III

### ASEAN RESPONSES

#### General

Today, the six ASEAN countries have been able to develop friendly and mutually beneficial relations. ASEAN's survival could be attributed to its ability to meet the challenge of its unity and diversity despite differences in cultural background, religion, language, history and by its determination not to allow those differences to impede the efforts to find common ground on which to cooperate.

Although ASEAN was not formed to become eventually a military alliance, it presents a major contribution towards the region's stability. Some reasons for that achievement, can be outlined as follows:

- o ASEAN members have never differed on the objectives of the Association because of different perceptions of the major powers strategic interests in the region and of the need to enhance national resilience that can cope with adverse internal forces as well as against the pressures of external powers.
- o ASEAN has been pragmatic in the pursuit of its goals and not pushing themselves beyond their common perceptions.
- o Member states recognize the limits of bilateralism and the importance of multilateral approach to a world that has become increasingly interdependent.

On the other hand, that is not to suggest that there are no differences among ASEAN countries in coping with the challenges, not only on Kampuchea, but on other issues as well. These differences can be explained as follows:

- o Being institutionally not an integrated regional grouping, each member state retains a maximum degree of its respective sovereignty.

- o Historical events such as the different process of achieving their respective national independence, contributed in fundamental ways to different principles in their foreign policies.

- o The geopolitical situations and domestic considerations may also account for different perceptions, priority of interests, and degree of perceived security.

- o Diversity among ASEAN member countries in terms of history, religion, tradition, political system, social standard and geography could constitute domestic constraints in their efforts to accelerate common perceptions of interests and to heighten regional awareness.

Aside from the threat of internal subversion, concern for security for its member states from external interference, was paramount in the motivation for establishment of the Association. In this regard, ASEAN launched the ZOPFAN concept in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration 1971, reaffirmed later on in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and Treaty of Amity and Cooperation signed at Bali Summit in 1976. The time was opportune to express ASEAN's concern over the threat of external interference and the danger of involvement in major power conflicts. The concept of ZOPFAN is meant to be a framework for peace and security in Southeast Asia. It is a response to the kinds of threat perceived by the ASEAN member states, at least, until the emergence of the Kampuchean problem. It was intended to prevent Southeast Asia from becoming an arena of international conflict.

To varying degrees ASEAN has succeeded in collective and pragmatic actions to place the future of ASEAN in its own hands and actively try to influence the environment. On the diplomatic front, ASEAN is making good progress, especially in its campaign to isolate Vietnam. On the other hand, ASEAN has yet to achieve the kind of economic cooperation originally

visualized when ASEAN was formed. The reason for this is because the ASEAN six, with the exception of Singapore which is industrialized, produced and export primary commodities that tend to compete with rather than complement each other. More than ever before, ASEAN needs to guard against the economic chaos which could destabilize its economic system and threaten the security of the region.

#### Increasing Regional Stability

The question ASEAN faces is how it should react to the challenge to stability of the region. The Bali Summit, February 1976, and the Kuala Lumpur Heads of State meeting in August 1977, tried to respond to those challenges and determine acceptable and sound solution. Primary steps included the development programs launched in ASEAN countries.

In the economic and social fields, future growth is not promising. It is threatened by the impact of protectionist pressures and the collapse of oil prices. ASEAN's collective commitment to peace and economic development and its record of solid accomplishment, might be seriously affected. The development of the proportionate strength, cohesion, and stability in ASEAN countries sufficient to discourage or withstand outside efforts at domination or manipulation, may accordingly decrease.

On the other hand, the best evidence of ASEAN's ability to conduct coordinated diplomacy is found in the common stand of member countries on problems related to the development of the international political situation. The continuing escalation of the global arms race, particularly in its nuclear dimension, is also in issue of ASEAN's attention.

In the meantime, as a result of political, economic and cultural cooperation, ASEAN has successfully enhanced regional stability. Accordingly military cooperation--at least in bilateral terms--is more likely to be

expanded. In the future, acceptable military cooperation, will no doubt be considered as a primary contributor for regional stability and will, in turn, for the regional resilience as well.

#### The Prospects for Military Cooperation

ASEAN's cautious attitude towards any idea of a military alliance or a multilateral defense arrangement, may in part account for the reluctant, and even suspicious attitude on the part of its member states. In general, it would depend on the idea that the concept is not perceived as a "military pact and as giving up their nonaligned status as well." Moreover, a western equivalent of the Soviet model of collective security would be unacceptable.

Meanwhile, the sharp reduction in U.S. military presence in the region provided a compelling impetus for closer ASEAN unity and prompted its members to take a hard, fresh look at their mutual interests in the face of what was perceived to be a common security threat. The main thrust of decisions at both the Bali and Kuala Lumpur Summits, was that ASEAN governments should try to make themselves immune from insurgency and infiltration from outside by:

- o Settling intraregional disputes between member states peacefully so that differences could not be exploited by outside powers.
- o Removing the grievances which Communist and other rebel groups manipulated. The latter was to be done by providing a more favorable climate for economic growth and development in each of the member nations by launching a series of regional economic cooperation programs.

Above all, at least in the light of Indonesia's perception, the idea of a collective security or defense alliance would have little relevance to the sources of threats to the peace, security and stability of ASEAN. As examined earlier, these sources of challenges are a mixture of internal and intraregional conflicts and external interference. With the assumption that

the superpowers would be the dominant power within such a military arrangement, it still would be unable to prevent internal or intraregional conflicts, external interference that such conflicts may bring about. On the contrary, instead of eliminating the threats of subversion and infiltration, and thus of internal unrest and instability, military alliance with a great power may tend to increase instability because of the great power's involvement in internal conflicts. Alliance may even involve the dependent countries in such conflicts, as demonstrated by the engagement of some Southeast Asian Countries in American intervention in Vietnam.

To move out from this cruciality, therefore, the defense and security arrangement of the non-communist countries that make up ASEAN, must never invite the superpower's involvement, and must only operate internally among its members, at three levels, those are national, bilateral and in some cases multilateral. ASEAN members should adhere strongly to the principle not to deal directly with defense and security matters. Moreover, there is no ASEAN defense association or ASEAN Pact.

CHAPTER IV  
MILITARY COOPERATION IN APPLICATION

General

Within ASEAN, the most advanced form of defense and security cooperation in 1976-1977 was between Indonesia and Malaysia. In 1972, Indonesia and Malaysia actually had formed a committee to deal with Communist guerrilla remnants along the mountainous jungle border joining the Indonesian province of West Kalimantan and the East Malaysia State of Sarawak. This cooperation had been progressively expanded to cover combined naval and air force exercises, coordinated sea patrols and exchange of intelligence in all fields connected with security. It was until February 8, 1977 at a meeting in Kuala Lumpur of the Malaysia-Indonesia border committee, when both countries were preparing to hold the first combined maneuver between Malaysia and Indonesia. Indonesia took further steps when it foreshadowed dispatch of Indonesian military observers to future combined operation by Thai and Malaysian Armed Forces against the Communist along the Thai-Malaysian frontier. From that time on, Indonesia believed that other ASEAN members could establish or extend military cooperation based on the Malaysia-Indonesia pattern without having to do it through a military pact.

This breakthrough, then, was acted on and--with the exception of Malaysia and the Philippines--other ASEAN states forged similar security ties with their neighbors, a process that was accelerated after the Vietnamese invasion into Kampuchea in December 1978. In further progress, the six ASEAN members have taken a series of steps in recent time. To encourage the achievement of a network of bilateral defense ties, another initiative of Indonesia included a consideration of a Thai offer to cooperate in the defense industry field.

Possible areas of collaboration would include aircraft manufacture, shipbuilding and armaments production.

In the meantime, Thailand has offered military training facilities to the small but oil-rich Islamic Sultanate of Brunei which has well equipped defense forces. Since 1983 Singapore has opened its command and staff course to officers from Malaysia and Indonesia, the first time foreign students have been admitted to the highest military course conducted in the Singapore Armed Force. Prior to that, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand had consecutively exchanged senior officers in their respective Command and General Staff Colleges.

The latest agreement known was signed on December 4, 1984 between Malaysia and Indonesia covered the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police and intelligence agency collaboration along all borders between the two neighbors. It also included plans for combined bulk purchase of defense supplies and equipment to cut costs and material so that the two Armed Forces can work together effectively in a crisis.

All in all, military cooperation is useful to enhance the military capability that in turn will be the significant factor to maintain the stability of the region. Moreover, the ability of national forces to operate together in a crisis is one of the objectives of bilateral exchanges and exercises. Therefore cooperation among the ASEAN countries in this field should be strengthened.

#### The Objectives

By definition, internal conflicts and instability are within the domain of national affairs and are, therefore, the responsibility of each nation. Only when a nation can prevent, contain and overcome internal conflicts, can it ensure its security and stability. In other words, this is the reflection

of national resilience which its underlying idea will cover all the aspects of the national life. It is, in essence, a nation's capability in ideological, political, socio-cultural, economic as well as military terms, to ensure its own national stability from external challenges.

Just as the prevention of internal conflicts would ensure national stability, the prevention of interregional conflicts would ensure regional stability. In this respect national resilience ensures national stability, as well as regional resilience would ensure regional stability, and both levels of resilience would in turn ensure security from external challenges.

By uniting in regional cooperation of ASEAN and by attempting to resolve intraregional conflicts by peaceful means, the member states are avoiding the possibility of external interference which threatens regional stability. That, at least, is in the interest of all nations in the region, especially those preoccupied mainly with national development. Therefore, the ASEAN region is not the monopoly of, nor to be dominated by any one nation and it is in the interests of the countries of the region to keep it that way.

Regional Cooperation in military terms in the framework of regional resilience should not go beyond ASEAN's goal: "strengthen cooperation to prevent instability." From this perspective, the elaboration of military cooperation's objectives, will be:

- o Create a better deterrent factor to meet the external challenges.
- o Enhance military capability among ASEAN's countries, which is very useful for contingency purposes.
- o Strengthen the sense of solidarity among the ASEAN's countries.
- o Role as a good precedence for the neighboring countries and attract the non-ASEAN countries in Southeast Asia to join ASEAN.

### The Steps in Application

Considering the problem's complexity existing in Southeast Asia, military cooperation among ASEAN, first of all must not sacrifice the nonalignment policy of ASEAN, and secondly, it will not involve other powers from outside.

In this regard the form of such cooperation must primarily be arranged in agreement on a bilateral basis, so that it is flexible enough to accommodate modifications needed, while on the other hand is able to ensure the continuity of its existence. A multilateral basis should also be considered as a ground for extended cooperation, as far as agreed by more than two countries and perceived as not impending ASEAN progress.

Using such bilateral or multilateral arrangement as a basis, the suggested steps in order to make this cooperation more capable and stronger, will be:

- o Create a common understanding in terms of military operations, such as:
  - oo Military terminology.
  - oo Improvement of software (SOP, FM, etc.).
  - oo Inter-recognition of doctrines.
- o In the training fields, the activity must be intensified with:
  - oo Exchange of more students, in many levels of education or training centers.
  - oo Exchange more instructors, in many levels of education or training centers.
  - oo Exchange personnel (not limited only to officers) in "on the job training" programs.
- o Intensity Combined Exercises:
  - oo Without troops (CPX, map exercise, map maneuver).

- oo With troops (field exercise, field maneuver).
- o In the operational field, combined actions must be intensified with:
  - oo Border meeting activities and exploit them as means of communication.
  - oo Patrol activities (included sea patrol) and exploit them as means of practicing coordination.
  - o Consider the creation of a Combined Operational Center that works primarily on a routine basis for handling such activities:
    - oo Information gathering and exchanges of intelligence.
    - oo Planning of combined military activity, especially patrol activity (land and sea).
    - oo Early warning and early detection (at least to record) for border violations from outside.
    - oo Center for long term combined activities, including research and development activity.
  - o Other activities which are useful, includes:
    - oo To hold sports events regularly or continually, such as ASEAN military games, ASEAN military academy games, sports team exchanges.
    - oo Top level exchange visits, on a regular basis.
    - oo Cultural events held by the military community.
    - oo Military build-up should include the standardization of equipment and the extension of joint effort military industry.
    - oo Opening the possibility of using ASEAN military units in a peacekeeping force assignment under the U.N. flag (for example, an ASEAN Brigade consisting of three different nation's battalions).

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

ASEAN as a regional cooperation grouping, chiefly through economic, technical, scientific and cultural interchange has made significant progress in the last 20 years, the establishment of which was free from the role of any outside power.

Despite the primary differences of opinion in the region, ASEAN has developed in terms of international status and the commitments of its members. Indonesia as the largest country in ASEAN can play a dominant role in increasing degree of regional stability in a more integrated approach. In the meantime, an extension of military cooperation among the ASEAN countries is acceptable as far as it is in the domain of nonalignment pattern.

The external challenges for the ASEAN are the primary consideration for strengthening regional stability. Those challenges include superpowers interests, Indochina problems, Chinese and Japanese interests and also the impact of the neighboring situation.

The best response to those external challenges for ASEAN is strengthening its regional resilience derived from regional stability. To achieve those objectives, ASEAN must make an all-out effort which includes not only economic, socio-cultural and political aspects, but, in some instances military considerations.

Regardless of the form of military cooperation among the ASEAN countries, such cooperation must be arranged on a bilateral basis, in some cases multilateral, in order to accommodate flexibility. Meanwhile, steps can be taken to activate and increase military cooperation. In general, those activities would include training, exercises, personnel exchanges, operational and other important fields.

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